

JUNE 85

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: DDCI		6/6
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p><i>John,</i> This is a little bit different from what we discussed on Saturday in that we decided to confront the issue in #4. The original is going through ER on its way to the DCI.</p>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 56

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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DD/O 85-0948

5 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Excellence Task Force

SUBJECT: Where Do We Go From Here

1. The first phase of the Excellence Program is over. The goals of rallying the workforce to the cause, getting people to think, and collecting a set of recommendations which could be translated into immediate and productive action have been achieved. But, this was the easy part, and much remains to be accomplished.

2. What remains to be done is more difficult, but potentially more rewarding. The objective now called for, we think, is to strengthen an Agency culture that promotes initiative and encourages creative action to accomplish our mission. This is a long term effort that seeks to affect behavior and make excellence a day-to-day part of our business. It will not work when management is insulated from subordinates and the workforce falsely assumes it is powerless to act unless directed to do so from above.

3. This stage of our search for excellence is not a technique or gimmick that can be imposed as though it were a management tool. It requires personal involvement by senior managers, which will cost them something in time and personal effort. More than the earlier efforts, it requires that managers believe in its value and demonstrate by their behavior that they do. If they do not, further attempts to "pursue excellence" will come across as manipulation.

4. Our sense is that most - not all - of your Deputy Directors and many at levels just below them do not believe that the excellence effort, at least in its present form, is worthwhile and productive. This does not mean that they do not value excellence. They are proud to be part of an organization that stands head and shoulders above most other bureaucracies

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and believe excellence is already pursued here. It does mean that our culture is different from many of the organizations described in excellence literature. For many Agency managers, "excellence" is too gimmicky.

5. We sense that what is needed is a wider understanding of the ultimate objectives and of the leadership behavior you expect from your senior managers in order to achieve those objectives. Then you must hold them accountable. As we move into the next phase, therefore, more personal effort on the part of top management is required. There must be more leading by example, more openness to ideas from below, and more direct contact with subordinates throughout the system. We recommend another session with your senior managers, perhaps away from Headquarters Building, to discuss your objectives and ways to achieve them.

6. Examples of the behavior you want to encourage, such as the examples we gave you last month, should be publicized. By publicizing you do several things:


- Lower ranks have a clear idea of what you prize. What is self-evident on the 7th floor is often not understood at lower levels.
- Examples of success make sense no matter what style of management is employed.
- It provides psychic rewards, which are very strong motivators in CIA.
- It is a way to influence recalcitrant managers whose behavior you wish to influence.
- Collecting examples of initiative and success will give management a better idea of where and how regularly we are approaching the goals you have set.

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7. Management itself runs a risk in encouraging increased initiative and risk taking. It will be necessary occasionally to pick up from the dirt an employee who tried and failed, and publicly pat him on the back and send him back on the field. At the same time, managers have to guard against employees who explain away poor work as innovative risk-taking. Your senior managers need to think about where they take the greatest risks and extrapolate from that what is acceptable in their organizations.

8. The task force leans toward the informal and personal as the best way to proceed now. Formal speeches can be effective in calling attention to an issue, but frequent personal example by managers over time and at all levels is necessary to reach your goal. Once the objectives and behaviors are clearly understood, there is a lot of room for entrepreneurial initiatives in how managers at all levels go about nurturing excellence. We have attached a set of recommendations for you and for the deputy directors. Many of these could be used by managers at lower levels as well, but our goal for this round is to provide you with some starting points from which you and the EXCOM members can set the tone for the rest of us.

FOR:



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
Attachment
As Stated

Distribution:
O-DCI
1-DDCI
1-EXDIR
1-SA/ODDO chr
1-ER
1-DO/Reg

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SA/ODDO/ [redacted] for ETForce:d

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Attachment to Memo For DCI From Excellence Task Force

Recommendations

1. Personal contact at the top will work best. The deputies should share the load. Lunches with small groups of people who have had recent accomplishments would be worthwhile. This could be in the cafeteria with everyone paying his own way. (Deputies can do this too on their own.)
2. Do a takeoff on your Christmas party, perhaps in the EDR, perhaps with spouses. Make creative problem solving the theme.
3. Ask the deputies to personalize the weekly reporting, naming the individuals or teams behind the accomplishments. Call a few of the people each week or at least have call on your behalf. (Deputies can do this too on their own.)
4. Take the top GS 14's/15's in each directorate and ODCI area (or the members of Taylor's seminar group) to for a day of brainstorming on internalizing excellence.
5. Establish a permanent body, perhaps with rotating membership, to replace the task force as your staff on excellence. This need not be a full-time body. Perhaps the senior career management people in each directorate could be tasked. Publicize their role.
6. Publish a regular, periodic message to all employees on excellence - your views, sample accomplishments, ideas that people give you for encouraging excellence.
7. Some lack of initiative can be attributed to a sense of powerlessness to change things. Have the graphics people develop a few posters along the lines of "you don't know if you can do it until you try."
8. Identify a few people who have a knack for relating to junior people (in either rank or age). It's a fact of life that many would not feel comfortable in the presence of the DCI. Use your surrogates to extend your reach. (The DDCI and the DDA are good at this.)

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9. Every level of management, given a little thought, can identify little marks of disrespect in the way we do business. Charge your managers with identifying and eliminating a half dozen or so. (The group came up with the following examples: professionals are introduced to visitors by full name, secretaries by first name only, if at all; the farther down you go in the perceived rank of functions, the dirtier, smaller, and ill-equipped your office becomes; people who do the "grunt work" in big projects are often not consulted or even informed in the planning stage - they are not considered part of the team.)
10. Managers who repeatedly have significant accomplishments within their areas of responsibility, obviously are doing something right in managing their people. One person who can extract excellent performance from others is worth his/her weight in gold. There should be special recognition annually for managers below the SIS level. The emphasis should be on getting things done through others, rather than personal accomplishment in a substantive field.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Executive Registry

85- 2250/2

6 June 1985

NOTE FOR: Director of Personnel

FROM: Executive Assistant/DDCI

Bob:

The DDCI thinks the attached has some merit
and would like to get together with [redacted]
[redacted] and see if you can't profit from his
ideas.

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Dist:
Orig-adse
2 - DDCI
1 - ER File



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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

85- 2250/1

6 June 1985

NOTE FOR: Chief, Psychological Services Division
Office of Medical Services



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Appreciated your suggestion for improving
Agency selection processing. I have passed it
on to Bob Magee and asked him to get together
with you to see if he can work something out.

/S/ John N. McMahon

John N. McMahon

cc: ExDir
DDA
D/Pers

Dist:
orig - Addressee
2 - DDCI
1 - ER File



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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Executive Registry
85- 2250

FROM: [Redacted]
C/PSD/OMS
706 C [Redacted]

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 21 May 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. AD/MS

5/21/85

J

No. 5

The proposal attached is submitted for consideration under the terms of your "Pursuit of Excellence" Program.

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3. DDCI

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5. DCI

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Attachment

FORM 3-62

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USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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☐ UNCLASSIFIED

21 May 1985

SUBJECT: A Proposal Focused Upon Possible Improved
Efficiency In Agency Selection Processing

COMMENTS:

The observations which follow draw upon data recording systems which are not standarized in terms of time base-lines (FY vs. CY data) or most importantly in terms of definition of "who is an applicant?" In the present proposal, every attempt has been made to standardize data reporting.

While several data points may not agree perfectly with office statistics of record, the data cited are sufficiently accurate for identifying several principles which negatively influence Agency selection processing.

PRINCIPLE I

As gross numbers of applicants presented for Agency selection processing increase, the proportion of applicants found "unsuitable for employment" increases disproportionately both at the level of the earliest legitimate screens (PATB Testing) as well as at the level of the final (most expensive to the Agency) Headquarters screens.

DATA POINTS

EARLIEST LEGITIMATE SCREENS (PATB TESTING)

	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>EST. FY85</u>	
Numbers Tested					STAT
"Not Recommended for Further Processing"					STAT

FINAL SCREENS (HEADQUARTERS PROCESSING)

	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>EST. FY85</u>	
Numbers Processed					STAT
Numbers Rejected					

(*Raw numbers provided are based upon extrapolations from the first half of FY85 processing activities.)

The reader is cautioned not to compare/contrast "PATB Testing" data directly with "Final Screening" data. First, no clerical level applicant placed into "Headquarters Screening" has completed the PATB (clerical applicants represent about 1 in 3 of all "Headquarters Screening" applicants). Second, of all Professional Level applicants who reach "Headquarters Screening, at least 1 in 5 have not passed through the PATB early screen. All of these cited facts warn against highly detailed analyses of available data.

In spite of the disparities in collection problems cited, present data support the contention that the number of identified "unsuitables" (early and late screens) increase at a rate greater than the rate of applicant input to the system.

PRINCIPLE II

The human resource cost to the system to accomplish a "discontinue processing" action during final (Headquarters) screening is at least twice that of the cost to accomplish "approved for Agency employment" during final screening.

PRINCIPLE III

To the extent it is possible to define a pool of applicants identified as "Most Likely to Succeed" (MLTS) in terms of Headquarters Processing, to that extent the Agency can anticipate:

1. a greater proportion of "Approved for Employment" among Headquarters processed applicants, and
2. a more efficient time and personnel concentration of resources in the selection processing system since processing of MLTS candidates (Fast Track) requires 50% or less effort than processing of Slow Track applicants.

SPECIFIC PROPOSAL

It is proposed that groups of senior representatives of OMS, OP and OS be constituted to review completed applicant files. It would be the task of these groups to sort all applicant files into the MLTS category (Fast Track) or into the "Default" category (Slow Track) based upon the combined judgment of the group (a judgment executed prior to review of the materials by the Expediter group).

Once an applicant is categorized as MLTS, he/she would be given priority in terms of Headquarters processing. (If and when there is a dearth of MLTS candidates in the system, the "Default" candidates would be assigned Headquarters processing slots.)

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CONCLUSIONS

It is possible, through careful review of applicant files by veteran representatives from OMS, OP and OS, to sort all applications into MLTS and "Default" categories.

It is suggested that a Senior Review Group (SRG) be formed to sort applicant files into MLTS vs. "Default" (Fast vs. Slow Track).

It is further proposed that all SRG files sorted into the MLTS category be given priority processing. After all currently available MLTS applicants have been assigned Headquarters Processing "slots", then (and only then) should "Default" category applicants be assigned. (It is reasonably assumed that OP and OS also possess criteria for evaluating applicant cases in terms of MLTS vs. "Default.")

COMMENTARY

While it would be desirable to totally reject "Default" cases and to process only MLTS cases, the data base does not support such action.

What the data base does support is some action (using the expertise of the SRG) to identify the MLTS's vs. the "Defaults" in order to boost the efficiency of the present selection system while preserving our processing resources.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/IES				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO (attn [redacted])				
15	VC/NIC (1016 [redacted])				
16					
17					
18					
19					
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22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

Copy of DCI Speech on Excellence as requested.

Executive Secretary

17 June 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

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85- 2410

REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO
CIA EMPLOYEES
ON
EXCELLENCE

CIA AUDITORIUM
13 JUNE 1985

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IT WAS EXACTLY FORTY-FOUR YEARS AGO, ON JUNE 13, 1941, THAT PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, WITH A STROKE OF HIS PEN, CREATED AMERICA'S FIRST PEACETIME INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, KNOWN AS THE OFFICE OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF INFORMATION.

ON THE SAME DAY HE DESIGNATED WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, A LAWYER FROM NEW YORK AND A CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENT IN WORLD WAR I, AS ITS DIRECTOR. BEN COHEN, ONE OF ROOSEVELT'S FIVE WHITE HOUSE ASSISTANTS, DID THE PAPERWORK ON THIS. HE PROJECTED THAT DONOVAN WOULD HAVE A STAFF OF 92 BY THE END OF THE YEAR. WHEN BOMBS DROPPED ON PEARL HARBOR, LESS THAN SIX MONTHS LATER, DONOVAN HAD A STAFF SIX TIMES THAT, 596 PEOPLE TO BE EXACT. INCLUDED WERE 150 OUTSTANDING ACADEMICS FROM CAMPUSES AROUND THE COUNTRY WORKING AWAY AS ANALYSTS IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. THIS WAS THE GENESIS OF OUR DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE. BEGINNING IN THE MONTHS AFTER PEARL HARBOR, AT THE CONGRESSIONAL COUNTRY CLUB HERE IN WASHINGTON, AT OTHER TRAINING CAMPS AROUND AMERICA AND IN CANADA, THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS WERE BEING TRAINED IN SMALL ARMS, PARACHUTE JUMPING, INTELLIGENCE TRADECRAFT, WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE FULL RANGE OF SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. IN NEW YORK AND OTHER CITIES, FOREIGN NATIONALS AND REFUGEES FROM EUROPE WERE BEING INTERVIEWED. FOREIGN BROADCASTS FOR THE FIRST TIME WERE BEING RECORDED AND ANALYZED ON A SYSTEMATIC BASIS, MISSIONS WERE ESTABLISHED IN NEUTRAL CAPITALS.

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THAT WAS THE INCEPTION OF A TRADITION IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE -- OF MOVING RAPIDLY -- GATHERING TALENTED PEOPLE -- RISING TO NEW CHALLENGES -- TAKING ON NEW DIMENSIONS -- BECOMING EVER MORE VERSATILE -- A TRADITION WHICH HAS FLOWERED AND PERSISTED TO THIS DAY.

I TAKE THIS OCCASION TO REVIEW WITH YOU WHERE THIS TRADITION HAS BROUGHT US AND THE CHALLENGES WE FACE TODAY. BY JUNE 13, 1941, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT HAD SEEN NAZI GERMANY PICK OFF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AUSTRIA -- HITLER AND STALIN AGREE TO CARVE UP POLAND -- GERMAN ARMIES INVADE NORWAY, DENMARK, HOLLAND, BELGIUM, FRANCE, YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE -- THE SOVIET ARMY INVADE FINLAND -- AND HE HAD BECOME WORRIED ABOUT GERMAN AGENTS AS A FIFTH COLUMN IN SOUTH AMERICA. HOW MUCH MORE OMINOUS IT CAN APPEAR AS WE SURVEY OUR WORLD TODAY. WE SEE SOVIET TROOPS AND PLANES IN AFGHANISTAN, VIETNAM AND CUBA. WE SEE CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA AND NICARAGUA. WE SEE VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN CAMBODIA AND LIBYAN TROOPS IN CHAD AND UGANDA. WE SEE SOVIET, CUBAN, LIBYAN, IRANIAN AND NORTH KOREAN AGENTS EVERYWHERE -- ALL ENGAGED IN AN AGGRESSIVE, SWEEPING CAMPAIGN TO UNDERMINE AND THREATEN AMERICAN INTERESTS ON ALL THE CONTINENTS OF THE WORLD.

FORTY-FOUR YEARS AFTER DONOVAN ACCEPTED ROOSEVELT'S CHALLENGE, WE STILL CONFRONT A WORLD AT WAR -- MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WARS, GUERRILLA WARS, CIVIL WARS, SUBVERSIVE MILITARY CAMPAIGNS, A WAR OF TERRORISM AND A CLANDESTINE WAR. TODAY, WE NEED TO IDENTIFY AND UNDERSTAND THIS MULTI-FRONT CAMPAIGN, TO ASSESS ITS PURPOSES, STRATEGIES AND RELATIONSHIPS, TO HELP DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AND COUNTER-STRATEGY.

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BEYOND THIS CHALLENGE -- THE CONTEST AGAINST THE HARD TARGET -- WE CONFRONT A STAGGERING ARRAY OF NEW CHALLENGES THAT I THINK WOULD HAVE SURPRISED EVEN BILL DONOVAN.

IF YOU JOINED CIA AT ANY TIME IN ITS FIRST 25 YEARS THE ODDS ARE THAT YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN WORKING ON SOME ASPECT OF THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA OR, TOWARD THE END OF THAT PERIOD, VIETNAM. BUT THERE HAS BEEN A REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN THE WORLD OF INTELLIGENCE, A CHANGE THAT ONLY RECENTLY HAS BEGUN TO BE RECOGNIZED FOR THE FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS IT HAS FOR THE WAY WE ORGANIZE AND CARRY OUT OUR WORK -- A CHANGE THAT HAS MADE THIS A VERY DIFFERENT KIND OF AN ORGANIZATION THAN IT WAS EVEN 10 YEARS AGO.

CIA HAS BECOME INVOLVED IN A RANGE OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND PROBLEMS THAT WOULD HAVE AMAZED OUR PREDECESSORS. IN ADDITION TO OUR WORK ON THE HOSTILE THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS COLLABORATORS, WE NOW COLLECT AND ANALYZE INFORMATION ON SUBJECTS AS DIVERSE AS: TERRORISM AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE -- NARCOTICS AND ILLEGAL FINANCIAL FLOWS -- GENETIC ENGINEERING -- INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS -- FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COMPETITION -- TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THEFT -- NEW RESOURCES AND MATERIALS -- THE FUTURE OF ECONOMICALLY VITAL COMMODITIES -- FOOD SUPPLIES AND WATER RESOURCES -- DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND IMMIGRATION FLOWS -- INSURGENCIES AND INSTABILITY AROUND THE WORLD -- RELIGIOUS, TRIBAL AND ETHNIC FORCES -- THIRD WORLD DEBT -- NUCLEAR AND

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CHEMICAL PROLIFERATION -- AND MANY, MANY MORE. OUR SCOPE IS SO VAST THAT WE NOW MUST HAVE SPECIALISTS IN MORE THAN 60 DIFFERENT DISCIPLINES TO DEAL WITH THE RANGE OF ISSUES ON OUR PLATE.

WE CAN ALL BE PROUD OF THE QUALITY AND RELEVANCE OF OUR WORK IN THESE FAR-REACHING AREAS.

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IN MY TALKS WITH FOUR CHIEFS OF STATE AND WITH FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS IN THOSE COUNTRIES, I FOUND GREAT INTEREST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ASSESSMENTS OF THIS AGENCY AS I DO IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE CABINET SECRETARIES, AND MILITARY LEADERS HERE AT HOME.

I WOULD LIKE TO DESCRIBE IN SOME GREATER DETAIL OUR OPERATIONAL, COLLECTION, TECHNICAL AND ANALYTICAL EFFORT IN JUST A FEW OF THESE AREAS TO REMIND ALL OF US HOW WE CAN QUICKLY REACT TO NEW CHALLENGES BY DRAWING TOGETHER EXPERTISE FROM DIFFERENT COMPONENTS.

-- TODAY THE NATION IS AROUSED BY THE SUCCESS OF THE WALKER SPY RING. MONTHS AGO, SEEING THE INCREASING SOPHISTICATION OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO PENETRATE OUR SECRETS BY TECHNICAL METHODS, OUR DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ESTABLISHED A TASK FORCE TO APPLY ITS SKILLS AND RESOURCES TO COUNTER THIS NEW THREAT TO OUR SECURITY.

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ANOTHER TASK FORCE IS WORKING BOTH TO BRAINSTORM AND DEVELOP SMALL SYSTEMS TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE INTELLIGENCE AND TO FACILITATE OPERATIONS AGAINST SUCH INCREASINGLY CRITICAL AND EXCRUCIATINGLY DIFFICULT TARGETS AS TERRORISM, ARMS SMUGGLING AND GUERRILLA WARFARE.

THE PRESIDENT IS COMMITTED TO DEVELOP A STRATEGIC DEFENSE HIS MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ADVISORS BELIEVE TO BE FEASIBLE. THE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN WORKING ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE FOR OVER 15 YEARS, AND HAVE ALREADY BUILT A MISSILE DEFENSE AROUND MOSCOW, ARE PROPAGANDIZING THAT SUCH DEFENSE WON'T WORK, IS NOT AFFORDABLE, AND EVEN IF IT CAN BE PAID FOR, IS DESTABILIZING ANYWAY. TO HELP COUNTER THIS, WE HAVE TASK FORCES READY TO BRIEF OUR ALLIES ON THE SOVIET PROGRAM ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE, ON OUR ONGOING ASSESSMENTS OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO DEVELOP RESPONSES TO THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND ON OUR ANALYSES

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OF SOVIET COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS IN THE SAME WAY WE BRIEFED ON SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS AND SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE WESTERN TECHNOLOGY IN 1982 AND 1983.

ANOTHER TASK FORCE IS EXPLORING WAYS IN WHICH FOREIGN TELEVISION BROADCASTS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO CURRENT INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AND OUR INDICATIONS AND WARNING RESPONSIBILITY.

WE ARE SEEING NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR CROSS-DIVISIONAL ANALYSIS, IDENTIFYING AREAS WHERE SKILLS UNIQUE TO ONE DIVISION CAN BE APPLIED TO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES HANDLED IN ANOTHER UNIT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE TEAM RESPONSIBLE FOR OIL FACILITIES VULNERABILITY HAS BEEN ASKED TO LOOK AT THE VULNERABILITY OF TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS AND COMPUTER CENTERS IN KEY INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES IN THE FACE OF TERRORIST THREATS. ANOTHER GROUP IS LOOKING AT PATTERNS OF SOVIET COMMODITY PURCHASES TO ASSESS THEIR IMPACT ON LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE POTENTIAL LEVERAGE THIS GIVES THE SOVIETS.

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AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE ARE RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THE
GOVERNMENT ON A WIDE RANGE OF PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT OUR COUNTRY.
WE IN CIA -- PERHAPS ALONE IN GOVERNMENT -- CAN AND MUST ALSO
LOOK TO THE DISTANT FUTURE TO ALERT OUR LEADERS TO TRENDS OF

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HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS FOR WHICH WE MUST BEGIN PREPARING TODAY. TWO RECENT EXAMPLES OF THIS INCLUDE AN EXTRAORDINARY ASSESSMENT BY HARRY COCHRAN OF THE PLAYERS AND FORCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA IN THE YEAR 2000 AND MAJOR STUDIES BY [REDACTED] ON TRENDS IN THE THIRD WORLD AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE AROUND THE WORLD IN THE COMING DECADES. THE LATTER STUDY, IN PARTICULAR, WAS CIRCULATED TO THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIALS IN GOVERNMENT AND PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR A LARGE AGENCY-SPONSORED CONFERENCE ON STRUCTURAL CHANGE THAT INVOLVED PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSION BY A WHO'S WHO OF LEADERS IN GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY AND THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY.

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GIVEN THE DRAMATIC GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF ISSUES AND PROBLEMS WHERE THE PRESIDENT EXPECTS CIA TO PLAY A ROLE, AND IN NEW WAYS TO GET AT THEM, AND GIVEN THE FINITE RESOURCES WE HAVE -- EVEN AFTER THE GROWTH OF RECENT YEARS -- THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO WAY THIS AGENCY CAN MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS -- AND NEW ONES CERTAIN TO COME -- BY RELYING ONLY ON THE DIRECTION OF A SMALL NUMBER OF MANAGERS ON THE SEVENTH FLOOR. THE ONLY WAY WE CAN COPE WITH THE MULTIPLICITY OF THREATS OUT THERE IS FOR THE TALENTED PEOPLE WE HAVE AT ALL LEVELS TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE BY RECOGNIZING AND TACKLING NEW ISSUES AND PROBLEMS. I'M GRATIFIED AT SEEING SO MANY INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL TASK FORCES DOING THAT SO EFFECTIVELY AND SO FREQUENTLY AT THEIR OWN INITIATIVE.

AS WE MOVE INTO THE LATTER HALF OF THE 1980s AND LOOK TOWARD THE 1990s, WE MUST GIVE STILL FREER REIN TO THE INITIATIVE AND

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IMAGINATION OF OUR CASE OFFICERS, THE ANALYSTS, THE SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS AND SUPPORT PEOPLE. OVER THE PAST YEAR WE HAVE TAKEN A GREAT MANY STEPS TO STRIP AWAY RED TAPE, DELEGATE AUTHORITY, IMPROVE THE FLOW OF INFORMATION, ENCOURAGE SELF-STARTING INITIATIVES, AND RECOGNIZE AND REWARD SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENTS. LAST YEAR'S DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR CAREER SERVICE HEADS TO APPROVE CASH AWARDS HAS PRODUCED A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES RECOGNIZED FOR OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENTS. FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THAT DELEGATION FROM 1 MAY 1984, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] HAVE BEEN MADE, AT A RATE SOME 50 PERCENT MORE THAN THE PREVIOUS YEAR.

LET ME NOW GIVE YOU JUST A FEW SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS WHERE BREAKTHROUGHS OR EXTRAORDINARY CIA PERFORMANCE WAS THE PRODUCT OF INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE AND IMAGINATION WELLING UP FROM OUR RANKS. AGAIN, SOME EXAMPLES:

-- [REDACTED] AN OGI ANALYST, WHILE AT THE COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES FOR TRAINING, SAW PERSONAL COMPUTERS WHICH WOULD ENHANCE HIS WORK IN THE STRATEGIC RESOURCES DIVISION OF OGI. ON RETURNING TO HEADQUARTERS HE OUTLINED HIS IDEAS TO HIS SUPERVISORS. THEY RESPONDED BY PURCHASING THREE IBM PCS AND ENCOURAGED HIM TO TEST OUT HIS IDEAS ON THE ANALYSIS OF WORLD ENERGY MARKETS. [REDACTED]

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
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[REDACTED] HAS BECOME AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR ANALYSTS THROUGHOUT THE DI ON THE USE OF PERSONAL COMPUTERS IN DOING ANALYSIS AND HAS BROKEN NEW GROUND IN THE USE OF MICRO-COMPUTERS, ESPECIALLY THEIR GRAPHIC CAPABILITIES, IN BRIEFING GOVERNMENT LEADERS.

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[REDACTED] A DIVISION CHIEF IN DI, ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE ASSEMBLED A TEAM OF OUTSIDE EXPERTS ON THE SOVIET UNION AND SOUTH ASIA TO DO AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. A RETIRED EMPLOYEE WITH EXPERIENCE IN DRAFTING AND MANAGING NATIONAL ESTIMATES IS IN CHARGE OF THIS EFFORT, BUT CIA ESTIMATES WERE NOT PROVIDED THE OUTSIDE EXPERTS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE INDEPENDENCE OF THEIR VIEW. THE PAYOFF WILL BE, IN ESSENCE, A "TEAM B" NATIONAL ESTIMATE PRODUCED INDEPENDENT OF THE DI ANALYTIC PROCESS. THIS WILL PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT OUTSIDE CHECK ON OUR OWN JUDGMENTS.

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[REDACTED] A PART-TIME TTAC EMPLOYEE, WHOSE PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT WAS IN THE DO, DEVELOPED PROCEDURES, NEGOTIATED GROUND RULES, SCREENED THE SENSITIVE TRAFFIC, AND PERSONALLY ABSTRACTED THE PERTINENT DATA FOR A FIRST - A SENSITIVE DATA BASE UNDER DO POLICY GUIDANCE, STAFFED BY DI PERSONNEL, AND HOUSED IN A DO COMPUTER. THE DATA BASE IS NOW A KEY RESEARCH TOOL, CONTAINING [REDACTED] ABSTRACTS. IT IS SERVING AS A MODEL FOR EXPANDING THE CONCEPT OF CORRELATING SPECIAL DO INFORMATION WITH THAT OF SEVERAL OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING COMMERCE AND DEFENSE.

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A NOTABLE EXAMPLE OF ALL THE DIRECTORATES WORKING TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY ON A HIGH PRIORITY, AND DIFFICULT TASKS, IS OUR CURRENT INTENSIVE EFFORT, WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, TO GAIN THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES AND TO REDUCE THE DANGERS FOR OTHER POTENTIAL VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

FACED WITH INTELLIGENCE TARGETS WHICH ARE EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT TO PENETRATE, THE DDO DRAWS HEAVILY ON THE PERSONNEL AND KNOW-HOW OF OTHER DIRECTORATES IN THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND PURSUIT OF LEADS TO THE NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE AND BASIS FOR FURTHER ACTION.

THE DDI REGULARLY PRODUCES REPORTS AND ANALYSES ON THE STATUS OF HOSTAGES AND ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS BEARING ON TERRORIST THREATS. THESE ARE EXAMINED DAILY BY DDO AND DDI ANALYSTS TOGETHER IN REGULAR JOINT MEETINGS ON THIS SUBJECT. THE DDS&T HAS DEVELOPED INNOVATIVE AND PRODUCTIVE TECHNICAL COLLECTION TECHNIQUES WHICH, DEPLOYED IN COOPERATION WITH THE DDO, HAVE CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO OUR COUNTER-TERRORISM WORK. THE DDA, INCLUDING THE OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES, REGULARLY DEALS WITH THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS FACING HOSTAGES, FORMER CAPTIVES AND THE FAMILIES OF TERRORIST VICTIMS, ESTABLISHES COMMUNICATION AND MOVES PEOPLE AND MATERIAL FOR HOSTAGE RESCUE AND COUNTER-TERRORIST EFFORTS. IN SHORT, A JOINT EFFORT IN WHICH THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF MOTIVATION AND TRUE TEAM SPIRIT OF OUR AGENCY ARE REFLECTED.

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IT WARMS MY HEART TO SEE INDIVIDUALS TAKING INITIATIVE TO
SPEED THE TEMPO AROUND HERE. SIMILARLY, I LOVE TO SEE NEW
RECOGNITIONS OF AND ATTENTION TO WHAT OUR CUSTOMERS NEED. HERE
ARE A FEW EXAMPLES:

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AND THERE ARE MANY, MANY MORE I COULD RELATE AND I'M SURE STILL MORE WHICH I DON'T KNOW ABOUT. YOU FIND THREE ELEMENTS RUNNING THROUGH, OR SHOWING UP, IN THESE EXAMPLES OF UNUSUAL INITIATIVE AND PERFORMANCE. ONE IS THE ALERTNESS TO RECOGNIZE A NEED OR A POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENT AND THE WILL TO MOVE ON IT.

ANOTHER IS THE BRINGING TOGETHER OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF EXPERIENCE, KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS LOCATED IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF CIA, OR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, OR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, OR THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING NEW AND BETTER.

A THIRD IS UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEEDS OF THE INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER TOGETHER WITH CLOSE ATTENTION, CLOSE RELATIONS, AND DEDICATION TO MEETING THOSE NEEDS.

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I MENTIONED EARLIER THAT CIA HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY OVER THE YEARS, EVEN OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS. WE WILL CHANGE A LOT MORE OVER THE NEXT DECADE OR SO, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD OF TECHNOLOGY. CHANGES IN THE WAY WE ORGANIZE TO ACCOMPLISH OUR MISSION HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE BECAUSE OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS. WE RECENTLY COMBINED THE OFFICE OF DATA PROCESSING WITH THE DOMESTIC COMPONENT OF THE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS TO CREATE THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY BECAUSE THE INFORMATION HANDLING AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES ARE MERGING.

YOU ALL KNOW THAT WE HAVE HAD SOME MARVELOUS SUCCESSES IN APPLYING TECHNOLOGY TO INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. WITH SATELLITES AND SENSORS OF ALL KINDS WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY IN DRAWING UPON TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE OUR PRODUCTIVITY WITH PROJECTS SUCH AS CRAFT AND SAFE. BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IN THE FUTURE WILL BE THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY TOOLS TO ENHANCE THE QUALITY OF OUR WORK: NOT JUST THE VERY CENTRAL FUNCTIONS BUT THROUGHOUT THE ORGANIZATION. THERE WILL BE MAJOR OPPORTUNITIES FOR US TO IMPROVE NEARLY EVERY ASPECT OF OUR PERFORMANCE AS WE INCREASINGLY HARNESS TECHNOLOGY -- PARTICULARLY COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY -- TO HELP US. THIS REQUIRES INNOVATIVENESS ON YOUR PART, SUCH AS THAT EVIDENT IN OSWR'S EFFORTS REGARDING THE SOVIET ASW PROBLEM WHICH I MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY.

NONE OF THE ABOVE WILL BE POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, WITHOUT HIGH QUALITY PEOPLE. TECHNOLOGY IS A TOOL FOR PEOPLE TO USE TO DO THINGS; IT'S NOT AN END IN ITSELF. IT'S VERY CLEAR THAT WE ARE

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GOING TO HAVE TO INVEST HEAVILY IN PEOPLE TO HELP THEM ADAPT TO CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES, TO HELP THEM STAY FLEXIBLE TO DEAL WITH THE CHALLENGES WE FACE. SO WE NEED TO MAINTAIN A VIGOROUS TRAINING PROGRAM AND WE NEED TO CONTINUE TO WORK TO KEEP OUR PEOPLE MOTIVATED AND TO KEEP ALERT AND TO STAY FLEXIBLE.

WE ARE ALREADY TAKING A HARD LOOK AT OUR TRAINING CURRICULUM. NEXT WEEK I WILL INAUGURATE A SEMINAR SERIES FOR SOME OF OUR MORE SENIOR OFFICERS WHICH WILL REVIEW AND EXPLORE OUR APPROACHES TO SOME OF THE NEW TOUGH PROBLEMS WE ARE FACING. THE PURPOSE HERE IS TO SEE WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM SOME INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCES AND TO BROADEN OUR PERSPECTIVES IN AN ERA WHEREIN THE AGENCY AND THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSION WILL BE FACING INCREASINGLY COMPLEX ISSUES.

THE MISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER OFFICERS OF OUR GOVERNMENT THAT HELPS THEM MAKE TIMELY AND WELL INFORMED DECISIONS CONCERNING THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. THEY ARE OUR CONSUMERS. THE EXCELLENCE OF OUR WORK AND CONTRIBUTION DEPENDS ON HOW WELL WE PERFORM THAT MISSION -- HOW WELL WE SERVE THEM. EXCELLENCE AT CIA IS A PRODUCT OF TEAMWORK AT ALL LEVELS. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LEADERSHIP HERE -- FROM BRANCH CHIEF TO THE VERY TOP -- IS TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH ALL OUR PEOPLE FEEL ENCOURAGED TO -- INDEED, RESPONSIBLE FOR -- TAKING THE INITIATIVE, CONSTANTLY IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF OUR WORK WHETHER RECRUITING AGENTS, PLANNING COVERT ACTION, DESIGNING SATELLITES, OR DOING ANALYSIS, OR PROVIDING SUPPORT.

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THAT BRINGS ME BACK TO WHERE I BEGAN: THE CHALLENGES THAT WE FACE CAN BE SOLVED ONLY BY TAPPING THE FULL RESOURCES -- THE IMAGINATION, CREATIVITY, SKILL AND ENERGY -- OF OUR ENTIRE ORGANIZATION. AS THE EXAMPLES I HAVE DESCRIBED DEMONSTRATE, WE HAVE A STRONG FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO BUILD.

THERE IS STILL MUCH TO BE DONE IN UNFETTERING AND CHALLENGING PEOPLE OUT THERE ON THE FIRING LINE. I INVITE YOU TO DROP ME A NOTE WITH ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU HAVE. I LEARNED MORE ABOUT OUR ORGANIZATION AND WHAT MAKES IT TICK, AS WELL AS GETTING ENORMOUS SATISFACTION OUT OF READING THE 600 ODD LETTERS OF SUGGESTION AND CRITICISM SENT ME A YEAR AGO AFTER I SPOKE HERE ON EXCELLENCE.

EVEN IN A BUREAUCRACY AS FLEXIBLE AS CIA'S, EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE RED TAPE, ENCOURAGE INITIATIVE, FOSTER CREATIVITY AND IMAGINATION, AND MESH THE CAPABILITIES OF THE WHOLE AGENCY INEVITABLY WILL FADE AS BUREAUCRATIC TENDENCIES REASSERT THEMSELVES, DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY AGAIN CREEPS UPWARD, AND THE OLD WAY OF DOING BUSINESS SEEMS EASIER. INDEED, AFTER RISING DRAMATICALLY FOR A YEAR, CASH AWARDS HAVE DECLINED IN EVERY DIRECTORATE IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS. PEOPLE BECOME PREOCCUPIED WITH DAY TO DAY PROBLEMS AND OFTEN DO NOT CONSIDER INITIATIVES WHICH IN THE SHORT TERM ARE PERHAPS MORE DIFFICULT BUT WHICH PROMISE INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN THE LONG RUN.

IT IS EASY TO BE CYNICAL AND TO CONTINUE BUSINESS AS USUAL. BUT HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE IN CIA EVERY DAY ARE COMING UP WITH NEW INITIATIVES THAT IMPROVE OUR PERFORMANCE AND HELP US CARRY OUT

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OUR MISSION MORE EFFECTIVELY. MANY OF THESE PEOPLE -- PERHAPS TOO MANY -- NEITHER EXPECT OR RECEIVE ANY SPECIAL RECOGNITION AND NO ONE MAY RECOGNIZE THEIR ACTIVITIES AS PART OF AN "EXCELLENCE" PROGRAM. NO MATTER WHAT AN ORGANIZATION CALLS IT, HOWEVER, IT IS ABSOLUTELY IMPERATIVE THAT PEOPLE AT ALL LEVELS ENCOURAGE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH INITIATIVE IS ENCOURAGED AND RECOGNIZED IN WHICH NEW WAYS OF TACKLING BOTH NEW AND OLD PROBLEMS ARE UNDERTAKEN, IN WHICH THE UNITS IN THE ORGANIZATION POOL THEIR SKILLS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR COMMON MISSION.

I AM NOT ASKING TODAY FOR A MASSIVE NEW EXCELLENCE PROGRAM. I SEE CORPORATIONS AND AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT POURING OUT SLICK AND FANCY COLOR BROCHURES EXHORTING AND MAKING SUGGESTIONS FOR EXCELLENCE. THAT'S NOT OUR STYLE. RATHER, I WISH TO USE THIS OCCASION TO REMIND ALL OF US AGAIN THAT THE OBJECTIVES OF ENCOURAGING INITIATIVE FROM ALL LEVELS, RECEPTIVITY TO NEW IDEAS, AND DIMINISHING BUREAUCRACY ARE NOT MET THROUGH A ONE-TIME CAMPAIGN BUT ONLY BY BECOMING AN ENDURING PART OF THE AGENCY CULTURE. THERE IS STILL MUCH TO BE DONE, INCLUDING RENEWED ATTENTION TO COMMUNICATION AT EVERY LEVEL, NEW EFFORTS TO PROMOTE COOPERATION BETWEEN DIRECTORATES ON SPECIFIC PROBLEMS, GREATER INVOLVEMENT OF EMPLOYEES IN DECISIONS AFFECTING THEIR WORKING CONDITIONS, AND MORE.

THE AGENCY HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE STABILITY IN ITS SENIOR LEADERSHIP AND MORE RESOURCES TO WORK WITH IN RECENT YEARS. WE ARE WORKING HARD AND DOING WELL. MUCH IS EXPECTED OF US AND YOU MAY REST ASSURED MORE WILL BE ASKED OF US. BUT, THERE IS ALWAYS

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THE DANGER THAT STABILITY WILL ALSO BREED COMPLACENCY AND CONTENTMENT. IN THIS WORK, ABOVE ALL OTHERS, WE MUST ACT AGGRESSIVELY AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY TO HOLD COMPLACENCY AT BAY, AND TO ENSURE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH CREATIVITY AND IMAGINATION FLOURISH AND DEDICATION TO THE CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT REMAINS STRONG. WHILE RECOGNIZING WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED, WE MUST REMAIN DISCONTENT WHEN COMPARING IT TO WHAT WE MIGHT ACHIEVE. MANAGERS MUST ESTABLISH THE ENVIRONMENT FOR EXCELLENCE. IT IS EVERY OFFICER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PRODUCE IT.

FINALLY, I AM AT THIS POINT GOING TO INSTITUTIONALIZE ONLY ONE THING. EVERY THREE MONTHS, OR AS FREQUENTLY AS IT EMERGES AS APPROPRIATE, WE WILL MAKE AVAILABLE TO YOU A MORE COMPREHENSIVE LISTING OF INITIATIVES TAKEN AND OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCES TURNED IN THAN I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GIVE YOU TODAY. I HOPE AND EXPECT THIS WILL STIMULATE NEW IDEAS AND PRACTICAL INITIATIVES, AS WELL AS INSPIRE BY EXAMPLE. THANK YOU FOR ALL YOU'VE DONE AND WILL DO.

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Executive Registry

85- 2359/1

12 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence


SUBJECT: Excellence Speech

I have a note from [] recommending no names in the speech
on the basis that:

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- a. It is impossible not to overlook some very important accomplishments;
- b. Auditorium is not right forum for this selected type of recognition;
- c. Examples are good - illustrative of what we are looking for - but not citing anyone.

I don't buy that myself, but would like your views also.


William J. Casey

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